NDSS 2026

DualStrike: Accurate, Real-time Eavesdropping and Injection of Keystrokes on Commodity Keyboards

Xiaomeng Chen, Jike Wang, Zhenyu Chen, Qi Alfred Chen, Xinbing Wang, Dongyao Chen

DualStrike

Abstract

Commodity keyboards emit stray magnetic fields as they operate — an unintended side channel that can be captured by a nearby magnetometer. DualStrike is the first attack framework that simultaneously eavesdrops on keystrokes and injects phantom keystrokes on commodity keyboards without any physical modification, using only off-the-shelf magnetic sensing hardware.

Unlike prior work that only demonstrated one capability at a time, DualStrike achieves both in real time, revealing a previously underappreciated threat surface in the era of ubiquitous magnetic sensors. This work is the first to demonstrate a vulnerability inherent to magnetic sensing platforms.

Key Contributions

BibTeX

@inproceedings{chen2026dualstrike,
  title     = {DualStrike: Accurate, Real-time Eavesdropping and Injection of Keystrokes on Commodity Keyboards},
  author    = {Chen, Xiaomeng and Wang, Jike and Chen, Zhenyu and Chen, Qi Alfred and Wang, Xinbing and Chen, Dongyao},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS)},
  year      = {2026}
}